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Subtitle The Sixth Sense

"The Sixth Sense" isn't a thriller in the modern sense, but more of a ghost story of the sort that flourished years ago, when ordinary people glimpsed hidden dimensions. It has long been believed that children are better than adults at seeing ghosts; the barriers of skepticism and disbelief are not yet in place. In this film, a small boy solemnly tells his psychologist, "I see dead people. They want me to do things for them." He seems to be correct.

subtitle The Sixth Sense


The psychologist is Malcolm Crowe (Bruce Willis), who is shot one night in his home by an intruder, a man who had been his patient years earlier and believes he was wrongly treated. The man then turns the gun on himself. "The next fall," as the subtitles tell us, we see Crowe mended in body but perhaps not in spirit, as he takes on a new case, a boy named Cole Sear (Haley Joel Osment) who exhibits some of the same problems as the patient who shot at him. Maybe this time he can get it right.

We are of opinion that it was a question for the jury whether the operator was negligent. It could have been found that the speed of the car, as it was "crossing" West Sixth Street, was in violation of the ordinance in that it was not reduced to such a rate as would make possible an immediate stop. The jury could have found, from answers to interrogatories and the operator's testimony, that after the car started from the stop at West Fifth Street, it proceeded at a rate of speed of about fifteen miles an hour, but that this speed was reduced to about twelve miles "going across West Sixth Street." The answers to interrogatories and testimony of the operator are to the effect that he first saw the deceased when he was about twenty or twenty-five feet "away," or about twenty feet "ahead" of the car. He testified that when he saw the deceased "twenty feet away he did nothing to slacken the speed of the street car," and that the deceased was two or three feet away from it when he first slackened its speed by applying the emergency brake. It is true that the answers to interrogatories and the operator's testimony are also to the effect that the emergency brake was applied when the deceased was twenty feet away from the car. But in these respects the evidence, as already pointed out, was contradictory. The jury could make use of their common sense and conclude that a street car, travelling at about twelve miles an hour for a distance of twenty feet, would not be in collision at the end of that distance with a man who had to walk approximately twenty-one feet in the same space of time to arrive at that point. They could conclude that the street car was travelling from three to four times as fast as the man and, therefore, that it would travel three or four times the distance covered by him in a given time. In these circumstances of obvious conflict in the testimony,

or that he looked carelessly. For all that appears, he may have looked carefully, or he may have thought reasonably that he could cross the street in safety, relying to some extent, as he was entitled to, upon the operator of the car using reasonable care to avoid running him down. Boni v. Goldstein, 276 Mass. 372, 376-377. Conrad v. Mazman, 287 Mass. 229, 234. Snow v. Nickerson, 304 Mass. 63, 65. Hess v. Boston Elevated Railway, 304 Mass. 535, 538. As is said in DeAngelis v. Boston Elevated Railway, 304 Mass. 461, at page 462, "If the decedent formed a judgment that, under the circumstances, it was safe for him to cross the street in front of the approaching car, and he failed by but a few feet in doing so [as in the case at bar], we cannot say as matter of law that such a judgment, although mistaken, was also careless." Minihan v. Boston Elevated Railway, 260 Mass. 490, 491. It is true that the operator testified that the deceased did not look up when the gong was sounded, and that so far as he could tell, the deceased was not observing the approach of the car. But he also testified that the deceased walked across with his chin on his shoulder. The evidence does not disclose which shoulder, but if it was the left, it is obvious that with his head in this position the approaching car would be in the line of his vision. It could have been found that the deceased turned on an angle toward the car when he was a "couple" of feet from the nearest inbound rail. It seems apparent that this change of direction, in the circumstances disclosed, was only an incident to the deceased's being hit by the car, and that the jury could have found that he would have been hit in any event if he continued across the track without changing his direction. As bearing upon the question whether the deceased was aware of the approaching car, it will be recalled that the operator testified that he seemed to hasten his steps to get over the tracks, but that he did not seem to try to "beat" the car. The jury may have considered that this testimony indicated not only that the deceased was aware of the approaching car, but also that he was not attempting to "beat" the car in the sense that he was acting unreasonably. Grant v. Boston Elevated

reference is made to alcoholism, one in the statement of the injuries, the other in the clinical diagnosis. Section 1 of said c. 46, provides, among other things, in effect, that the disease or cause of death, "defined so that it can be classified under the international classification of causes of death," shall be among the facts contained in the certificate of death. See Dow v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 297 Mass. 34, 37. That classification calls for a statement of (1) the principal cause of death and related causes of importance, and (2) contributory causes of importance. It also calls for a clear indication where death is due to violent causes. A standard certificate of death, see Walcott v. Sumner, 308 Mass. 413, relating to the international classification contains the following subtitle: "The principal cause of death and related causes of importance were as follows." The blank space immediately beneath this is filled in by way of example as follows: "Injured by a fall; fractured skull." This is followed by the subtitle: "Other contributory causes of importance," and the blank space following this contains the words "Chronic myocarditis." There is nothing in the record in the case at bar to the effect that any autopsy was performed on the deceased. See G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 38, Section 6 (St. 1939, c. 475); G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 113, Section 2. 041b061a72


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